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INTRODUCTION

This research seeks to shed light on one professional group
practicing in the Israeli Occupied Territories: defense lawyers
representing Palestinians before the Israeli military courts. These
lawyers—Israeli and Palestinian—are important actors within a
judicial apparatus, which has been in place since 1967, and is part of a
prolonged military occupation.1 Over the years, the military court
system in the Occupied Territories has taken several steps to
professionalize, mainly by incorporating numerous universal features
that characterize civil courts operating in liberal democracies. 2 These
include the exclusion of lay judges (non-jurist military personnel) from
the bench, the adoption of special trial procedures for minors, allowing
appeals on interim and final decisions, and generally amending the
military substantive and procedural rules to resemble those of the
Israeli civil system. 3
Almost all Palestinians charged in military courts are represented
by a defense lawyer, Israeli or Palestinian.4 The Israeli defense lawyers
are members of the Israeli Bar Association (“IBA”) and are governed
by the Israeli law regulating professional practice—The Israel Bar
Association Act of 1961. 5 Israeli lawyers are also bound by the ethical
rules promulgated by the IBA, and by Israeli court decisions
interpreting the law, role, and duties of lawyers. 6 Palestinian lawyers
are members of the Palestinian Bar Association. After the
establishment of the Palestinian Authority (“PA”) following the Oslo
Accords of 1996, the legal profession in the PA began to

1. GEORGE E. BISHARAT, PALESTINIAN LAWYERS AND ISRAELI RULE: LAW AND
DISORDER IN THE WEST BANK (1989).
2. Smadar Ben-Natan, Inside and Outside Israeli Law: The Application of Israeli Law in
the Military Courts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 43 THEORY & CRITICISM 45 (2014)
(Isr.) [hereinafter Inside and Outside Israeli Law].
3. Id.
4. YESH-DIN, BACKYARD PROCEEDINGS: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS IN THE MILITARY COURTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (2007).
5. Bar Association Act, 5721-1961, 178 (1960-61) (Isr.).
6. NETA ZIV, WHO WILL GUARD THE GUARDIANS OF LAW? LAWYERS IN ISRAEL
BETWEEN THE STATE, MARKET AND CIVIL SOCIETY (2015) (Isr.).
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institutionalize. 7 To date, ten law schools operate in the PA where
Palestinian students can obtain a law degree.8 In 1997, the Palestinian
Bar Association was established, the PA enacted a law regulating the
legal profession, and a professional ethical code for Palestinian lawyers
was adopted. 9 These professional developments took place as the
Israeli occupation continued, which included the prosecution of
thousands of Palestinians each month before the military courts and
their incarceration in Israeli prisons for security and criminal offenses
committed in the occupied territories.
Hence, the Palestinian legal profession has been institutionalizing
in the context of two political processes. The first is the PA’s course of
“state building,” which required the formation of an independent
justice system, including an autonomous and professional bar. 10 The
second is the ongoing national conflict, including a military occupation
that has lasted for over fifty years. 11 From the Israeli side, the military
courts have increasingly endeavored to resemble—at least formally,
structurally, and procedurally—normalized judicial institutions,
despite being courts that operate under a military regime. 12
Representation before the military courts takes place with close
proximity to the issue of political/security prisoners—a highly potent
and contested topic both within the PA, as well as between Israel and
the Palestinian representative bodies. 13 What the military justice

7. Mutaz Qafisheh, A Century of the Law Profession in Palestine: quo vadis?, 25 INT’L J.
LEGAL PROF. 175 (2018).
8. Mutaz M. Qafisheh, Modern Legal Education in Palestine: The Clinical Programs of
Hebron University, in EXPERIMENTAL LEGAL EDUCATION IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD: THE
MIDDLE EAST & BEYOND 198-235 (Mutaz M. Qafisheh & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, eds., 2016).
9. Id.
10. Qafisheh, supra note 7.
11. See generally David Kretzmer, The Law of Belligerent Occupation in the Supreme
Court of Israel, 94 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 207 (2012); ORNA BEN-NAFTALI, MICHAEL
SFARD & HEDI VITERBO, THE ABC OF THE OPT: A LEGAL LEXICON OF THE ISRAELI CONTROL
OVER THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY 264 (2018).
12. Ben-Natan, supra note 2.
13. See infra note 69; Government of the State of Palestine, PERMANENT OBSERVER
MISSION OF THE ST. OF PALESTINE TO THE UNITED NATIONS N.Y., http://palestineun.org/aboutpalestine/government-of-the-state-of-palestine/ [https://perma.cc/AKL9-HH2U]. The Israeli
government considers the PA’s support for Palestinians convicted of security offenses—
including providing financial support to their families, as well as other forms of support such as
legal defense—as unacceptable. The government has initiated legislative steps to authorize the
government to deduct the sum the PA provides families of convicted offenders from the amount
of money Israel transfers to the PA (e.g., mainly taxes collected in relation to Palestinian
workers). See, e.g., Shahar Hay, Knesset passes bill to deduct terror funds from PA in first
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system regards as an illegal act and a punishable offense is often
considered an act of political resistance in the eyes of Palestinians.
Hence, defense lawyers perform their work on a finely delineated line
that embodies multiple aspects and different layers of interactions
between the professional/legal and the political. As they mediate
between their clients and the Israeli military regime, they can either try
to politicize the process, or take part in the law’s pacifying and
normalizing role within the occupation.
By focusing on defense lawyers practicing before the court, this
research aims to probe into their practice and better understand the
interplay between the legal and the political in representing clients
before the military courts. The inquiry wished to reveal: who are the
lawyers that appear before the “courts of the enemy”? What are the
formal and informal regulatory regimes that govern their practice?
What are the lawyers’ motivations for doing this work? Who pays their
fees? Do they consider themselves part of the Palestinian political
struggle or professionals dedicated mainly to the wellbeing of their
individual clients? Who do they owe their fiduciary duties to? Do they
believe they are legitimating the Israeli occupation or is their practice
part of the political struggle against it? How do they demarcate the
relationship between the professional and the political? Have the
answers to these questions changed over time, as lawyers continue to
practice before “the judicial arm of a control regime that has been
deemed the longest military occupation in modern history”? 14
Part II lays out the literature on the military courts and the lawyers
practicing before them. Part III describes the human rights legalistic
critique of the military justice system, and Part IV analyzes how this
same discourse affects the interplay between the professional and the
political on the practice of defense lawyers. Part V portrays the
regulatory regime that applies to each group of lawyers and Part VI
discusses the makeup of this particular professional group. Part VII
describes the research method applied in this project and Part VIII the
main findings. The Article concludes by questioning the legitimizing
force of legal representation before the Israeli military courts.

reading, YNET NEWS (May 8, 2018), https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L5254508,00.html [https://perma.cc/B6WM-XS2A].
14. BEN-NAFTALI, SFARD & VIRTEBO, supra note 11, at 264.
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II. MILITARY COURTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES –
LITERATURE REVIEW
The military courts operating in the Occupied Territories are part
of a comprehensive and complex legal system that applies in these
areas. This system consists of an amalgam of legal sources. They
include local law - civil law (mainly Jordanian law, and after the Oslo
Accords, Palestinian law) and religious law (relating to family and
personal status issues), as well as international law (international
humanitarian law and international human rights law), as well as
military law (orders issued by the Israeli army, which cover almost all
areas of life).
The topic of the law of occupation has been addressed extensively
in academic writing, with a particular focus on the role of the Israeli
judiciary in the review of military action in the territories. 15 This
literature constitutes the general background for my research, which
addresses one institution within this system—the military courts and
specific professional actors within them: defense lawyers. These
lawyers work amidst two additional professional groups: military
prosecutors and military judges.
Military courts operating in an occupied territories are recognized
under international law, specifically in Article 66 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention. 16 In the Israeli context, they were established through
military orders promulgated immediately following the occupation in
1967, 17 and since 1970, the basis for their operation has been Security
Provisions Order No. 378. 18 The military courts’ jurisdiction includes
15. For most recent references, see generally AEYAL GROSS, THE WRITING ON THE
WALL: RETHINKING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION (2017); Kretzmer, supra note
11; EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION (2nd ed. 2012); BENNAFTALI, SFARD & VIRTEBO, supra note 11; YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION (2009); MICHAEL KARAYANNI, CONFLICTS IN A CONFLICT: A
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASE STUDY ON ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES (2014).
16. Article 66 of The Fourth Geneva Convention states: “In case of a breach of the penal
provisions promulgated by it by virtue of the second paragraph of Article 64, the Occupying
Power may hand over the accused to its properly constituted, non-political military courts, on
condition that the said courts sit in the occupied country. Courts of appeal shall preferably sit in
the occupied country.” Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, art. 66 (1949) [hereinafter The Fourth Geneva Convention].
17. Meir Shamgar, Legal Concepts and Problems of the Military Government—The Initial
Stage, in 1 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967–
1980: THE LEGAL ASPECTS 14 (Meir Shamgar ed., 1982).
18. LISA HAJJAR, COURTING CONFLICT: THE ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM IN THE
WEST BANK AND GAZA (2005); Sharon Weill, The Judicial Arm of the Occupation: The Israeli
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security related offenses committed in the territories as well as criminal
offenses without any security component (such as theft, bribery, taxrelated offenses, environmental offenses, traffic violations, domestic
violence, and assault). Following the establishment of the PA, there
have been detailed provisions regulating the jurisdiction of these courts
regarding offenses committed within the jurisdiction of the PA. 19 Even
though military courts’ jurisdiction covers offenses committed by
Jewish settlers, this population, by and large, is not tried in these courts,
but in civil Israeli courts, within Israel. 20
Weill labels the military courts “the judicial arm of the
occupation,” Hajjar identifies them as “both a product and site of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” and Cavanaugh posits that the military
courts are “at the intersection of politics and law.” 21 They are a central
component of the Israeli army’s apparatus that maintains, controls,
sustains, and normalizes the prolonged Israeli occupation. 22 They are
also an established, dominant and familiar institution among
Palestinian residents of the Occupied Territories, since most families
have experienced some encounter with their judicial régime—either
directly or indirectly. 23
It is estimated that since the beginning of the occupation, over
800,000 Palestinians had been prosecuted in the military courts, for
both security-related and criminal offences. 24 According to data
provided by Israeli sources, each year a minimum of 12,000
indictments are filed before these courts. 25 Since almost all of these
cases end with a plea bargain, and suspects tend to be kept in custody
for prolonged periods, this judicial process also coincides with an
Military Courts in the Occupied Territories, 89 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 395, 401 (2007);
YESH-DIN, supra note 4.
19. HAJJAR, supra note 18, at 46.
20. B’TSELEM, LAW ENFORCEMENT ON ISRAELI CIVILIANS IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES (1994).
21. Weill, supra note 18, at 1; HAJJAR, supra note 18, at 1; Kathleen Cavanaugh, The
Israeli Military Court System In The West Bank and Gaza, 12 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 197,
205 (2007).
22. Weill, supra note 18.
23. HAJJAR, supra note 18 (courting conflict)
24. Nethanel Benisho, Criminal Law in the West Bank and Gaza, 18 IDF L. REV. 299
(2005); Weill, supra note 18, at 396; Neri Ramati, From Security Interrogations to Criminal
Evidence: Methods of Interrogation by the General Security Services and the Police of
Palestinians Accused of Security Offenses in the Military Courts (2017) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
25. Ramati, supra note 24.
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extremely high level of incarceration. 26 For example, during February
2016, 6,700 Palestinians from the West Bank were incarcerated in
Israeli prisons, out of a population of 1,800,000 Palestinians in the
West Bank. 27
Research on the legal and institutional aspects of the military
courts has been conducted through different lenses over the prolonged
Israeli occupation. First, several military officials that had taken part in
the establishment and operation of the courts documented their formal
basis and modus operandi. Meir Shamgar, who served both as Judge
Advocate General (“JAG”) in 1967, and later as Israel’s Attorney
General and President of the Israeli Supreme Court, documented the
legal basis of the occupation in its early stages, including the military
courts. 28 Zvi Hadar, who was the JAG following Shamgar, also
described the legal framework and structure of the military courts. 29
Amnon Strashnov, who served as president of the military courts and
then as the Israel Defense Force’s (“IDF”) JAG during the 1980s,
documented in his book Justice Under Fire, the legal apparatus in the
occupied territories during the first Palestinian uprising, including the
role of the military courts therein. 30 Nethanel Benisho, who currently
serves as the President of the military courts, documented the later
period of military courts’ operation, as well as the relationship between
the law applied in Israeli courts and that in military courts. 31
Second, international law scholars have pointed to the unique
character of the military courts under The Law of Occupation.
Cavanaugh describes the formal regulatory framework of the courts, as
well as the main features of their actual practice, and Kretzmer
critically analyzes the Supreme Court’s limited oversight of their
jurisdiction. Through the indeterminate and fungible legal concept of
territorial jurisdiction, Sharon Weill demonstrates how the military
courts assumed jurisdiction over offenses committed extraterritorially

26. ADDAMEER PRISONER SUPPORT & HUMAN RIGHTS ASS’N, PRESUMED GUILTY:
FAILURES OF THE ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE
(2009).
27. Ramati, supra note 24.
28. Shamgar, supra note 17, at 14.
29. Zvi Hadar, The Military Courts, in 1 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES
ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967–1980: THE LEGAL ASPECTS 193 (Meir Shamgar ed., 1982).
30. AMNON STRASHNOV, JUSTICE UNDER FIRE (1994).
31. Id.; Benisho, supra note 24.
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(for example, in Area A, under the control of the PA), thereby creating
a “borderless judicial domination.” 32
A third line of research on the military courts applies a sociopolitical methodology. In 1989, Bisharat published the first book that
explored the status and the role of Palestinian lawyers in the West Bank
(as labeled by the author), during the first two decades of the
occupation. 33 Bisharat described the lawyers as a disintegrating
profession, and explained how the lawyers’ strike, declared soon after
the occupation, in fact, led to the profession’s decline and
fossilization. 34 Bisharat continued to examine these lawyers a decade
later, again focusing on the intersection between lawyers’ professional
identity and the multiple political constraints surrounding their
practice. 35 As part of his exploration, he discussed the dilemma of
legitimating the occupation through representation in the military
courts. 36 Lisa Hajjar’s work on the military courts provides a hard look
at the perplexity of Israel’s claim to pursue “justice” within a nondemocratic military legal regime. 37 Hajjar’s fieldwork offers an
ethnography of the military courts from various points of view (those
of access, language, physical setting, and actors), and included
meetings and interviews with lawyers practicing in these courts. 38
Smadar Ben-Natan has conducted extensive work on the military
courts in recent years. Her focus has been on the consequences of the
application of Israeli legal norms and standards in the military courts. 39
Ben-Natan suggests that the move towards “legal harmonization” can
be understood as Israel’s response to the criticism alleging that it
violates procedural and substantive norms of international human
rights law in the military courts. 40 She claims that this move towards
legal-resemblance, in fact, hinders access to justice to the military
courts. It also weakens the application of international humanitarian
law during analysis of the legality of the occupation (by stressing
32. Weill, supra note 18, at 417.
33. BISHARAT, supra note 1.
34. Id.
35. George E. Bisharat, Courting Justice? Legitimation in Lawyering under Israeli
Occupation, 20 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 349, 365–405 (2005).
36. Id.
37. HAJJAR, supra note 18.
38. Id.
39. Smadar Ben-Natan, The Honey Trap: The Application of Israeli Law in the Military
Courts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2014) (unpublished MSt. dissertation, Oxford
University) [hereinafter The Honey Trap].
40. Id.
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international human rights law) and brings the reality on the ground
closer to a permanent occupation, if not de facto annexation, of the
occupied territories. 41
The military courts have been continuously monitored by
numerous human rights organizations over the years. These include
Palestinian human rights organizations, 42 Israeli human rights
organizations, 43 and international human rights groups. 44 The central
findings of these reports underscoring flaws in due process and
procedural failings that amount to human rights violations of
Palestinians prosecuted in the military courts, will be discussed in the
next section. As explained above, partially as a response to this critique,
the military orders introduced procedural and substantive amendments
to the court’s regulatory regime, in an attempt to move them closer to
the Israeli courts’ standards. 45
Finally, the military courts have been explored in a unique and
powerful documentary film, entitled “The Law in These Parts.” 46 The
film documents the establishment of the military legal system in the
occupied territories beginning in 1967, through testimony of military
legal professionals who had been its legal and institutional architects.47
The well-designed nature of the military courts’ apparatus and the
41. ADDAMEER PRISONER SUPPORT & HUMAN RIGHTS ASS’N, supra note 26; ADDAMEER
PRISONER SUPPORT & HUMAN RIGHTS ASS’N, DEFENDING PALESTINIAN PRISONERS: A
REPORT ON THE STATUS OF DEFENSE LAWYERS IN ISRAELI MILITARY COURTS (2008); RAJA
SHEHADEH & JŪNĀTHĀN KUTTĀB, THE WEST BANK AND THE RULE OF LAW (Int’l Comm’n. of
Jurists, Geneva eds., 1980).
42. For Palestinian human rights organizations, see, e.g., ADDAMEER PRISONER SUPPORT
& HUMAN RIGHTS ASS’N, supra note 26; SHEHADEH & Kuttāb, supra note 41.
43. For reports by Israeli human rights organizations, see, e.g., B’TSELEM, PRESUMED
GUILTY: REMAND IN CUSTODY BY MILITARY COURTS IN THE W. BANK (2015) [hereinafter
PRESUMED GUILTY]; B’TSELEM, NO MINOR MATTER - VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS OF
PALESTINIAN MINORS ARRESTED BY ISRAEL ON SUSPICION OF STONE THROWING (2011)
[hereinafter NO MINOR MATTER]; NO LEGAL FRONTIERS, ALL GUILTY! OBSERVATIONS ON
THE MILITARY JUVENILE COURT (2010-11); YESH-DIN, supra note 4; B’TSELEM, supra note
20; B’TSELEM, THE MILITARY COURT SYSTEM IN THE WEST BANK (1990) [hereinafter THE
MILITARY COURT SYSTEM].
44. For reports by international human rights organizations, see, e.g., LAWYERS’ COMM.
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LAWYERS AND THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM (1992); AMNESTY INT’L,
ISRAEL ET TERRITOIRES OCCUPÉS: JUSTICE MILITAIRE EN TERRITORIES OCCUPÉS [ISRAEL AND
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES]
(1991); INT’L COMM. OF JURISTS, INQUIRY INTO THE ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM IN THE
OCCUPIED WEST BANK AND GAZA (1989).
45. The Honey Trap, supra note 39; Inside and Outside Israeli Law, supra note 2.
46. THE LAW IN THESE PARTS (Ra’anan Alexandowicz ed., 2011).
47. Id.
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unremitting ways in which they took part in the institutional
legalization of the prolonged military rule, clearly demonstrate how
these courts had transformed into “the judicial arm of the
occupation.” 48
III. THE MILITARY COURTS—HUMAN RIGHTS, LAW, AND
POLITICS
As described above, since the 1980s, numerous human rights
organizations have monitored and scrutinized the Israeli military
courts. Their activity is part of a broader effort under which human
rights groups have observed and documented human rights violations
in the Occupied Territories. This approach utilizes the human rights
lens—through established standards, benchmarks, and norms—to
evaluate the critique that military courts cannot, and do not, function as
fair and independent judicial institutions, given their structural
affiliation with the military government. Hence, the human rights
approach differs from that of international humanitarian law (“IHL”).
While the Geneva Convention requires that military courts be
“properly constituted” and “non-political” (and that they sit in the
occupied territory), the human rights framework requires adherence to
additional norms. 49
Early in the occupation, human rights reports addressed essential
flaws in the operation of the military courts and the military justice
system in general. 50 Their main points were the lack of an appeals
court, the membership of lay (non-jurist) military personnel on the
bench, and failure to notify families of the whereabouts of a detainee.
They also challenged the practice of preventing lawyers and detainees
from meeting, lack of special procedures for minors, as well as the
length of the detention period before judicial review. These were
accompanied by complaints regarding inadequate physical access to
the courts, language barriers, failure to bring detainees to hearings and
their postponement, and other administrative flaws. 51
A significant part of this critique focused on the period that
preceded formal judicial hearings, during which detainees were held in
48.
49.
50.
note 43.
51.

As coined by Weil, supra note 18.
GROSS, supra note 15.
See SHEHADEH & KUTTĀB, supra note 42; THE MILITARY COURT SYSTEM , supra
SHEHADEH & KUTTĀB, supra note 41.
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custody and interrogated by security personnel. 52 During this period, in
which external scrutiny was limited and it was difficult to access a
lawyer, most detainees rendered a confession to the accusations against
them. 53 The detainees would remain in custody, and the court would
rarely remand bail. 54 Consequently, the main function of the court was
reduced to approving a plea bargain between the prosecution and the
accused, mediated by a defense lawyer. 55
As decades of occupation went by, and the temporary nature of
the occupation had lost most of its meaning—human rights law, due
process principles, and legalistic discourse have become vital parts of
the law of occupation—at least formally and rhetorically. 56 This trend
has infiltrated the military courts as well. An appeals court was
established in 1989, and lay judges were removed from the bench. 57 A
designated court for minors was established with special procedures
(such as holding hearings in camera and limiting the interrogation of
children without their parents), and, in general, the military penal code
was gradually harmonized, to a substantial degree, with the Israeli
penal code. 58
From the point of view of military personnel, this process led to
improvement in the court’s functioning and better adherence to human
rights norms. 59 Critical scholars and human rights activists
acknowledged that the procedural measures introduced increased
professionalization, independence, and impartiality. 60 However, they
pointed to the limitations of such measures to counter the court’s
fundamental partiality and prejudice: legalization may have led to an
appearance of procedural justice, but it did not touch the core problems
20.

52. See ADDAMEER PRISONER SUPPORT & HUMAN RIGHTS ASS’N, supra note 26, at 17-

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. B’TSELEM, supra note 20; ADDAMEER PRISONER SUPPORT & HUMAN RIGHTS ASS’N,
supra note 24; NO MINOR MATTER, supra note 43; B’TSELEM, PRESUMED GUILTY, supra note
26.
56. See GROSS, supra note 15; Orna Ben-Naftali, PathoLAWgical Occupation:
Normalizing the Exceptional Case of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and Other Legal
Pathologies, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW: PAS DE DEUX 129–200 (Orna Ben-Naftali ed., 2011).
57. Ben-Natan, Inside and Outside Israeli Law, supra note 1.
58. Id.
59. Zvi Lekah, Protecting Human Rights in the Military Courts in the Era of the Fight
Against Terror, in THE MORDECHAI KREMNITZER BOOK 641 (A. Bendor, H. Gnaim, I. Saban,
eds., 2017) (Isr.).
60. Ben-Natan, The Honey Trap, supra note 39; GROSS, supra note 15.
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of the system. 61 Moreover, some claimed that the salience of the human
rights discourse overshadowed adherence to norms under IHL and the
law of occupation. 62
Despite legalization, Israeli, Palestinian, and international human
rights organizations persisted in their critique of the court, pointing to
entrenched problems of various sorts. First were the unchanged
conditions of pre-trial detention and interrogations, which led to a
compelling tendency for confessions. 63 Absent any significant
modification of these pretrial procedures, most cases in military courts
continued to end in a plea bargain. 64 The military court affirmed
confessions that were allegedly obtained based either on a rational
calculation of a risk of a harsher outcome, or because of difficulties in
conducting a full trial, while the accused remained in custody. 65
Second, some of the formal procedural safeguards, especially those
relating to minors, were simply not observed in practice. 66 Third, many
decisions of a military judge were discretionary, and depended on
acceptance of the prosecution’s or the defense’s argument. 67 Military
judges, for the most part, ruled in favor of the prosecution, and rejected
the positions of the defense. 68
Be the reason as it may, this tendency was said to reveal the
unevenness of the military court and its impartiality. Under this line of
thought, since the military courts were established by the military
regime and constitute part of the military occupation’s apparatus, they
must serve the system upon which they rely. Within a highly potent
political conflict, they are the final institutions that transform “acts of
resistance” into criminal charges. Despite enhanced legalism, the
courts cannot perform as equalizers; by and large, they do not bridge
the power gap between the occupier and the occupied.
67F

68F

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

The Honey Trap, supra note 39.
GROSS, supra note 15.
ADDAMEER PRISONER SUPPORT & HUMAN RIGHTS ASS’N, supra note 26.
Id.
Id.
NO MINOR MATTER, supra note 43.
ADDAMEER PRISONER SUPPORT & HUMAN RIGHTS ASS’N, supra note 26.
ADDAMEER PRISONER SUPPORT & HUMAN RIGHTS ASS’N, supra note 26.
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IV. FUSING THE PROFESSIONAL AND POLITICAL—DEFENSE
LAWYERS
The tension between formal legalization and substantive justice
described above applies, similarly, to the professional sphere and to the
defense lawyers practicing before the military courts. Arguably, more
law opened up opportunities for novel legal arguments, in particular
claims regarding violations of procedural due process. In theory,
enhanced legalization meant that lawyers could harness their
professional skills to the advantage of their clients, exploiting
opportunities for professional interventions. They could detect a
violation of a detainee’s rights during interrogation, claim lack of
sufficient evidence to support extended detention, demand remedies
based on flaws in the treatment of minors, and the like. In Part VIII, the
Article explores this potential for professional intervention.
Concurrently, the mass processing of thousands of cases before
the military courts, their institutionalization, and professionalization,
impacted the Palestinian polity as well. The PA government includes a
Ministry for Prisoners’ Affairs. 69 The Ministry covers the costs of the
defense of Palestinians charged with security offenses in the military
courts. 70 The office retains lawyers to provide representation through
renewed annual retainer agreements and other fee arrangements. 71 In
addition, a number of Palestinian and international NGOs located in the
territories fund legal aid for political prisoners. These include the
Addameer Prison Support and Human Rights Association, Defense for
Children International, and the Palestinian Prisoners’ Club [Nadi ElAsir Al Falestini], who pay lawyers to provide legal defense in the
military courts. 72
Alongside this apparatus, an informal (but politically powerful)
Committee of Prisoners’ Affairs (“the Prisoners’ Committee”) operates
from within the Israeli prisons and maintains close contact with the
Ministry of Political Prisoners. 73 The Prisoners’ Committee has

69. Government of the State of Palestine, supra note 13.
70. Interview with J.B., attorney (Feb. 19, 2018).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. On the activities of The Palestinian Committee of Prisoners’Affairs, see, e.g., Calls for
saving hunger-striking prisoners in Israeli jails, PALINFO (Sept. 14, 2016),
https://english.palinfo.com/news/2016/9/14/Calls-for-saving-hunger-striking-prisoners-inIsraeli-jails [https://perma.cc/4EUP-WBCS].
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occasionally intervened on topics relating to prisoners’ status and
conditions, including legal representation before the military courts. 74
Hence the web of institutions, laws, personnel, policies,
procedures, and other types of regulation have created a multi-faceted
space within which the defense lawyers work. The law is but one factor
within this complex framework. To be sure, the process of legalization
and professionalization underscores the professional aspects of the
defense lawyer’s potential and actual work. However, these traits
intertwine with the political aspects and the social context of their
lawyering. Therefore, the core questions remain: to what extent do
these new professional opportunities impact the representation of
defendants in the military courts? What do defense lawyers think about
them? How have they affected the defense bar practicing before these
courts?
To this point, Ben-Natan has strongly argued that participating in
the legal game reinforces and strengthens the illusion of justice, without
tackling the underlying flawed foundations of military rule and the
military justice system. 75 Ban-Natan asserts that the legal amendments
and new procedures have, in fact, imposed additional hurdles upon
lawyers—especially Palestinian lawyers who do not speak or read
Hebrew. 76 She claims that they had worsened the lawyers’
opportunities for effective representation and in fact situated them at a
disadvantage. 77 Ben-Natan, however, does not claim to bring the voices
of the Palestinian lawyers themselves on this matter; rather she offers
a viable point of view regarding the impact of legal harmonization on
their professional role.
My research, detailed below in Parts V, VI, VII, and VIII, offers
a complementary perspective on this point, based mainly on interviews
with lawyers about the courts, their professionalization, and the
lawyers’ role within the system. It suggests that the defense lawyers
themselves carry ambivalent and mixed attitudes towards the military
courts, and about their role as lawyers within this system, the meaning
of practicing law under military rule, and the fusion of the political and
professional. It also demonstrates that despite being a small group, the
defense lawyers are not a monolithic group, and voice different views
on these topics.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
The Honey Trap, supra note 39.
Id.
Id.
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V. REGULATORY REGIME—FORMAL RULES AND INFORMAL
POWERS
There are multiple formal and informal regulatory regimes that
govern defense lawyers practicing before the military courts. First,
lawyers must abide by the national (state) rules regulating the legal
profession.
Israeli lawyers are governed by the Israeli Bar Association Act of
1961, and the bylaws and regulations promulgated under this law.78
They are members of the IBA, to which they pay yearly membership
dues; Israeli lawyers are subjected to the IBA’s disciplinary jurisdiction
and ethical standards. 79
Palestinian lawyers are governed by the Palestinian Civil
Advocates Law (formerly named The Legal Profession Law No. 3). 80
They are members of the Palestinian Bar Association (“PBA”), pay
dues to the organization, and practice under its jurisdiction. 81 The
Palestinian lawyers are covered by the PBA’s pension scheme and are
governed by its professional and ethical norms. 82
However, the territorial jurisdiction of these laws and professional
organizations is limited to Israel and the PA and does not extend to the
occupied territories. 83 Since they practice in the occupied territories,
defense lawyers are under the jurisdiction of the military rules and
orders promulgated by the military commander. Sections 74-85 of the
Order Regarding Security Provisions (“the military order”) address the
topic of “Parties and their Representatives” in the military courts and
relate to legal representation. 84 Sections 74 and 76 of the military order
state that defendants in the military courts have a right to be represented
78. Bar Association Act, supra note 5.
79. See Issachar Rosen-Svi, Constructing Professionalism: The Professional Project of
the Israeli Judiciary, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 760, 780 (2001); Eli Salzberger, Kesher
Hamishpetanim Hayiśraeli: Al Lishkat Orkhe Hadin Uba’ale Brita [The Israeli Jurists
Conspiracy: On the Israeli Bar and its Allies], 32 MISHPATIM 43 passim (2001) (Isr.); Neta Ziv,
Combining Professionalism, Nation Building and Public Service: The Professional Project of
the Israeli Bar 1928–2002, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1621, 1640–49 (2003); NETA ZIV, WHO WILL
GUARD THE GUARDIANS OF LAW? LAWYERS IN ISRAEL BETWEEN THE STATE, MARKET AND
CIVIL SOCIETY (2015) (Isr.).
80. Law No. 5 of Dec. 28, 1999 Concerning the Amendment of Legal Profession Law No.
3 of 1999, PALESTINE GAZETTE No. 32, at 5 (Feb. 29, 2000) (Palestine).
81. Qafisheh, supra note 7, at 17.
82. Id.
83. The IBA and PBA may, however, discipline lawyers for unethical behavior that does
not have territorial dimensions, such as general criminal behavior.
84. Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), 5770-2009 (Isr.).
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by an Israeli lawyer or a Palestinian lawyer—labeled “a local
lawyer.” 85 Under certain circumstances, a defendant may be appointed
a lawyer by the military court, which also determines the fee paid to
the appointed lawyer, as per Sections 77, 83, and 84 of the military
order. 86 In Section 80, the military order conditions the replacement of
a lawyer upon the approval of the court, 87 and, in Section 82, states that
the court will not refuse to approve switching a lawyer, unless the
change might lead to an unreasonable postponement of the judicial
proceedings. 88 In Section 85, the military order details a (gendered)
dress code for the lawyers appearing before it. 89
Other than these rather few provisions, the military order provides
no guidance on the additional aspects of defense lawyers’ conduct, nor
are there any ethical norms that apply to them. As in any court, the
presiding military judge is authorized to control and discipline conduct
in the courtroom, and this includes the power to require lawyers to
conduct themselves in a proper manner. The military court’s de-facto
power to police lawyers’ behavior relates, first of all, to issues of
civility and etiquette, including the duty to speak when addressed, the
requirement to not arrive late or fail to show up, as well as guidelines
regarding talking to family members present in the courtroom. It also
covers the role of lawyers as officers of the court and their part in the
administration of justice. This includes the lawyer’s duty of candor
towards the court, the prohibition against lying to the court, the duty to
reveal the existence of a former proceeding relevant to the case at hand,
and the like. 90 In the military courts, judges often exercise this
authority.
Alongside these formal rules, defense lawyers are indirectly
subjected to policies and decisions of the PA, in particular the Ministry
of Prisoner Affairs and the Committee for Prisoners Affairs. The fee
structure implemented by the PA establishes a multi-party relationship
between the lawyers, the clients, the military courts, and the PA itself.
As will be explained below, the impact of the fee arrangement is highly
determinate within the construct of representation. 91 It creates
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. §§ 74, 76.
Id. §§ 77, 83, 84.
Id. § 80.
Id. § 82.
Id. § 85.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.6, 1.7, 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
Infra Part VIII(D).
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incentives for lawyers to maintain a certain caseload, since the lawyers
become dependent on the income generated by these fees. The fee
structure is also relevant to questions of legitimacy of representation. It
enables the lawyers to hold the PA responsible for “cooperating” with
the military government and the occupier’s courts. Hence, it absolves
them from taking personal or collective professional responsibility for
the legitimation of the military courts, as fair and objective legal
institutions.
This construct of representation is not unidimensional. Given the
high caseload in the military courts—thousands of cases a month—the
courts rely on the presence of defense lawyers to process their cases in
an orderly and smooth manner. As will be discussed below, the military
courts have become entirely dependent on the defense lawyers and
cannot operate without them. 92 Military judges rarely make a judicial
move without the detainee or accused being represented. 93 Hence, the
defense lawyers have turned into an integral element within the military
judicial system.
Defense lawyers are also in close and constant contact with
prisoners’ families. A lawyer is usually contacted and hired by a
detainee’s family. Family members look upon them as crucial
mediators between the detainee and the military bodies. Families are
often involved in decisions during the hearings, such as the amount of
bail and the terms of the plea bargain, and the lawyers convey
information between the detainee and the family during “in real time”
representation.
VI. DEFENSE LAWYERS—MAKEUP AND PRACTICE
Observations and interviews conducted as part of my research
revealed the following findings. Currently there are about sixty to
seventy defense lawyers practicing before the military courts. About
forty percent of the lawyers are Israeli. Most of them are Arab citizens
of Israel or residents of East Jerusalem, and a handful are Jewish. Some
of the Israeli lawyers studied in Israeli law schools and others studied
abroad (mainly in Jordan). The larger group of lawyers that practice
before the military courts are Palestinian lawyers who are members of
the PBA. They studied law in a variety of law schools, most of them in
the Middle East (Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and North Africa) as well as
92. Infra Part VIII.
93. Infra Part VIII.
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in the occupied territories, where currently ten law schools operate.
Most of the lawyers are men, and there are fewer than ten women in
this practice.
For most defense lawyers, practicing before the military courts is
their sole, or main, professional occupation. This means that they
appear in a military court between four and five times a week and
remain in the court compound most of the day. Since the military courts
operate inside military bases, the defense lawyers spend most of their
working time in a secluded, Israeli military environment.
The lawyers’ counterparts are military prosecutors, military
judges, and the court’s logistic and administrative personnel. These
include guards (some belonging to the police and some to the IDF),
court translators, secretaries, and other administrative staff responsible
for processing the trials. All these functionaries wear military uniforms
and belong to the military apparatus maintaining the occupation.
Within this unique, if not peculiar, environment, the defense
lawyers constitute a distinctive professional group. Although small in
number, this group of lawyers is not monolithic. Each one has
constructed his or her rationale about the politics of representation and
has adopted a form of reasoning to account for his or her professional
role within the military courts.
Therefore, the objective of this research was to better understand
the formal norms and informal forces that influence the identity and
practices of defense lawyers in the Israeli military courts. Its goal was
to explore the intertwining of the professional and the political during
representation, as well as the politics of representing political/security
prisoners given the significance of this group and topic within the
Israeli-Palestinian context. In general, the research wishes to unveil a
legal site where law and politics interplay intensely, and in which the
legal profession plays an important role.
VII. RESEARCH METHOD AND SETTING
During the months of March, July, and August of 2017, and
during the first part of 2018, I conducted research on defense lawyers
in military courts. This stage of the research included ten visits to the
military court in the Ofer army base near Ramallah. Each visit lasted
between two and four hours. Being a licensed member of the IBA, I
accessed the court as any other lawyer would. At times, I was
accompanied by Arabic-speaking law students, who obtained ad-hoc
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permission to join me during these visits. In principle, the courts are
open to the public. In practice, one has to obtain a permit to enter, as
the courts are part of a closed army base.
The physical layout and architectural design of the court deserve
special attention. Entrance into the compound requires one to go
through a security check and to pass through a number of metal
electronic gates. Palestinians—including defendants who are not
detained and family members of the detainees—enter the compound
through a different gate, and are allotted a number of waiting areas, in
which they remain until called to enter the courtroom. There are seven
courtrooms (constructed as prefabricated units), set in a row, in which
different hearings take place. Separate rooms are designated for pretrail detention hearings, juvenile trials, appeal hearings, plea bargains
and full trials, and administrative detention hearings, among other
purposes.
There is a physical separation between the areas where families
wait, the “middle yard,” where the detainees are held in custody, and
the “back yard,” where the lawyers, prosecutors, and military personnel
have their offices. One cannot freely pass between the family waiting
area and the middle yard and back yard. The different courtrooms are
connected to each other by a wall/fence, in a way that blocks passage
from one side of the base to another. As a result, the most common way
to move between the different court areas is through the courtrooms
themselves.
Each courtroom has at least three doors: one for the use of
families/defendants/public, one for the judges, and one for the lawyers
and the detainees. This constellation leads to constant “traffic” within
the small courtrooms. Lawyers keep going in and out of the courtroom,
“cutting in” through one door and “cutting out” through another, in
order to get from one side of the compound to the other. Some of the
courtrooms are small, and the lawyers have to squeeze themselves to
pass through, especially when a number of detainees wait in the
detention area in the courtroom (behind a low wooden bar),
accompanied by their security guards. All this commotion occurs while
the judicial hearings continue. Since the lawyers often have hearings
that overlap in scheduling, a loudspeaker is used to summon them, as
well as to summon family members that are called to enter the
courtroom to attend the hearing of their relative. Family members go
in and out of the courtroom as hearings continue and make constant
attempts to communicate with the detained family member, and are
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frequently interrupted by the judge, who requires they refrain from
doing so.
This setup often leads to a somewhat chaotic feeling, which
unexpectedly also creates a certain atmosphere of informality and
casualness in the courtroom. Since judges, prosecutors and defense
lawyers are repeat players in these proceedings, they all seem to
recognize (and adhere to) the blurred boundaries between the formality
of the procedure and the loose ambience during which the trials take
place. I sat in court and observed different hearings, motions, and trials.
Judges were, for the most part, accommodating, and did not impose any
difficulties during my observations. Occasionally present in the court
were observers from Israeli NGOs, mainly women peace organizations,
that operate “court-watches” over court proceedings of women
defendants.
I conducted interviews with sixteen defense lawyers. 94 Most
interviews took place during the lunch breaks in the court hearings, in
the lawyers’ meeting room, or in the base’s open-air cafeteria. Two
interviews were held in a lawyer’s office in the occupied territories and
one in Tel Aviv (a Jewish lawyer). Most lawyers, but not all, were
accommodating and were happy to discuss their work with me. With
some, there were language barriers that could not be overcome. Others
were suspicious and did not want to talk. One lawyer, for example,
explained that the mere consent to be interviewed by an Israeli
academic legitimates the occupation and the military judicial
proceedings. He refused to take part in the research.
After my fourth or fifth visit to the court, more lawyers were
willing to meet and discuss various aspects of their work, despite some
ambivalence, suspicion, and hesitance some continued to express
during the interviews. Each interview lasted between forty-five and
ninety minutes. Eight interviews were recorded. Seven lawyers were
members of the IBA; six were members of the PBA; three were
members of both bars, but these lawyers first became members of the
PBA and then took the Israeli bar exam. The dual membership lawyers
resided in East Jerusalem. 95 Out of the sixteen lawyers, I met four
women.

94. Apparently, Hamas lawyers act separately. However, I did not meet any.
95. The Israel Bar Association Act requires members to be residents of Israel, rather than
citizens (section 42). Residents of east Jerusalem, most of whom are not citizens of Israel, can
become members of the Israeli Bar Association.
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FINDINGS

Practice Conditions

My research, observations, and interviews resulted in the
following findings. Most lawyers are repeat players in the military
court system. Their practice is constituted almost entirely of
representing defendants in the military courts, since it is difficult to
commit to other cases given the caseload and intensity of scheduled
hearings. This means that they come to court almost every day (four to
five times a week), and most have been doing so for years.
When a lawyer has a case scheduled in the military court, he
usually has to remain there at least half of the day, if not the full day.
Cases are not necessarily scheduled in a consecutive manner for the
same lawyers, and often they need to wait for hours between cases. As
a result, the lawyers find themselves spending most of their working
time in the military court compound. The base itself is quite small, and
the IDF personnel (professional and lay) remain in the same space. This
enables the lawyers to become familiar and to develop working
relationships with the prosecutors, judges, and administrative staff.
They work in a military base together. They buy food and drinks in the
same canteen and visit the same administrative offices of the courts.
This is a rare situation of physical “mingling” between Israeli soldiers
and Palestinians.
Given this setting, military judges know lawyers by name, as well
as by professional style and character. They often refer to them by their
first names. For example, during one hearing, a judge, somewhat
humorously, alluded to a lawyer as being “tough” and a “hardliner,”
while the other was referred to as more accommodating. More
accommodating means, as an example, agreeing to additional delays or
postponements in the hearing of the case, due to the prosecution’s
failure to bring a witness on its behalf. Witnesses are heard in cases in
which the defendant did not confess, or when the prosecution’s request
for detention pending trial is contested. However, the prosecution often
fails to present witnesses for a variety of reasons. Some witnesses are
soldiers on duty at the time of the event who have since been released
from the army. In other cases, witnesses are Palestinian “collaborators”
of some sort, and do not want to come to court to testify. This is a case
where the defense lawyer can insist on either releasing the client or can
use this failure during plea-bargaining as a consideration for a more
lenient sentence. There are some lawyers who are more assertive than
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others in such circumstances, and judges, who are familiar with the
lawyers’ attitudes—insinuate their views on the lawyers’ modes of
representation.
B. Differentiating Israeli and Palestinian Lawyers—The Question of
Professionalism
The interviews I conducted revealed a clear distinction, if not
stratification, between Israeli and Palestinian lawyers. To begin with,
most Israeli lawyers speak Hebrew, while most Palestinian lawyers do
not. It is therefore more difficult for Palestinian lawyers to navigate the
military justice system and to represent their clients. In theory,
interrogation materials need to be provided to the lawyers in Arabic
(some investigations are conducted in Arabic, the spoken language of
most defendants), but lawyers pointed to problems with obtaining this
material in a sufficient manner. The court hearings themselves are
conducted in Hebrew (though some judges seem to be fluent in Arabic),
and translators are provided. The opinions on the quality of translators
(usually Druze military personnel) were mixed. However, most
lawyers admitted there are severe problems with translation.
Israeli lawyers frequently criticized (some) Palestinian lawyers
referring to their professionalism. They recognized the strong
incentives for defense lawyers to “work with the system,” by entering
a plea on behalf of the client. However, they distinguished between
cases in which a plea bargain seemed to be the right professional
decision (where there were no detectable procedural flaws, and the
evidence against the accused was clear and substantial), and
circumstances in which it was possible to raise legal arguments on
behalf of the client. Such arguments would include, for example, that
procedures were not followed (for example a minor was detained
together with adults), or that the evidence against the defendant is weak
and can be contested, so the lawyer can modify the indictment or
mitigate the sentence (usually as part of a plea bargain).
Israeli lawyers repeatedly claimed that for various reasons some
Palestinian lawyers do not operate this way: they are quick to enter a
plea bargain, rarely challenge the evidence, raise no legal arguments,
and “trade” prospects of different clients in order to maintain a good
relationship with the prosecution. 96
96. This was a common allegation. The caseload of Palestinian lawyers, especially those
on the payroll of the PA, is extremely heavy. It includes defendants with severe, as well as
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In contrast, one senior Israeli lawyer who works with a Palestinian
prisoner rights organization offered a different way to understand this
conduct (which in and of itself was not contested). He claimed that
Palestinian lawyers can be “good lawyers” within the unjust system of
the military courts. He argued that these lawyers, even if they do not
speak Hebrew, and even if they cannot challenge evidence against their
client or detect procedural failures, should not be judged according to
such universal professional standards. Under this view, the typical
professional expectations from a legalistic lawyer assume a justice
system that is fair and impartial. Since the military courts fail to meet
these attributes, the role of defense lawyers should be redefined against
an unfair institutional reality, and the definition of professionalism
should be adjusted accordingly. Purportedly, the Palestinian lawyers
have learned to navigate the military justice system through its own
rationalization and institutional routine—the processing of thousands
of cases smoothly and orderly, which results in pacifying the resistance
against the occupation. Within this political context, it is unrealistic to
expect that good conventional lawyering will lead to any sort of justice.
Therefore, many Palestinian lawyers do the best they can: they meet
their client and provide emotional support, they maintain contact with
the family, and they try to get the best plea deal for their client while
working with and alongside the military prosecution, and by
maintaining a reasonable working relationship with the system.
These are two different ways to think about the role of lawyers
and about professionalism. The Israeli lawyers defined professionalism
in universal terms, underscoring the learned aspect of their work as the
central indicator of what it means to be a good lawyer. In contrast, the
senior Israeli-Palestinian lawyer offered a contextual understanding of
this term, which takes into account a reality, five decades long, of an
occupying force’s justice system that does not live up to its own claims
of fairness.
If we understand professionalism in these different meanings, it
can explain the findings described in section H below, that all
lawyers—Palestinian and Israeli—stated it was possible for them to be
“good” and “professional” lawyers in the military court system. This
lighter, offenses. Since plea bargains are an outcome of negotiation with a prosecutor – all of
which are repeat players in the system – Palestinian lawyers need to maintain a workable
relationship with the prosecution. The claim is that they often do not negotiate each case
individually on its merits, but exchange benefits and “deals” among different clients they
represent. This was considered to be unethical and unprofessional by some lawyers.

752

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:2

determination depended upon the way they related to the military
justice system and how they managed the fusion of its legalistic and
political components.
C. The Quandary of Plea Bargaining
My research showed that all lawyers referred to the problem of
plea bargains as an essential, ingrained predicament within the military
court system. The strong inclination to resort to plea bargains in the
military courts is the outcome of two sets of features.
The first is more substantive—the absence of lawyers from the
preliminary stages of the detention and investigation. As explained in
Part III, most detainees are arrested by the army or the police in the
territories, and they remain in custody in detention centers for
interrogation, under conditions that make it extremely difficult for
lawyers to meet with them. 97 They must be brought before a judge for
extension of the detention after ninety-six hours (if suspected of a
security offense) or forty-eight hours (if suspected of a criminal
offense). 98 In addition, in security-related offenses, the IDF or the
General Security Service are authorized to prevent a meeting with a
lawyer for fifteen days, a period that can be extended by the military
court. 99 As a result, many detainees arrive in court after they have
already confessed to some offense, making it difficult for the lawyer to
conduct a hearing or a trial with evidence and witnesses.
Second, the military court system is highly burdened with
thousands of cases each month. 100 Therefore, it heavily relies on plea
bargains—which take a few minutes at the most to approve—in order
to process the caseload. To a large extent, lawyers are discouraged from
litigating cases and are encouraged to enter plea bargains. A number of
lawyers admitted that their chances of getting a more lenient sentence
for their client decreases if they choose to conduct a full trial (called an
“open trial”), compared to the “deal” they can obtain through a plea.
This dilemma in and of itself is not foreign to criminal defense
lawyering and constitutes a well-recognized phenomenon in the
criminal justice system at large. In the military courts, however, this
97. See supra Part III.
98. Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), 5770-2009, § 31, 31A, 31B
(Isr.). Special provisions are set for minors.
99. Id. §§ 58-59A.
100. Ramati, supra note 24.
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occurrence is exacerbated. The reason is the lack of significant
oversight and screening of cases at the initial investigation stages,
which takes place in the Israeli civil system, in which weaker and
unsubstantiated cases that will not lead to indictments are weeded
out. 101 The lack of similar screening in the military justice system—
which has a much higher detention rate—allegedly leads to a higher
percentage of cases brought to trial, and among these over ninety-nine
percent end with a conviction.
From the lawyers’ perspective, the plea bargain quandary cuts
through the heart of their professional experience. Most lawyers
reflected upon this dilemma arduously, revealing a lucid recognition of
the institutional straits within which they conduct their work. The
reality under which they are expected, and in fact do submit themselves
to the “plea pipeline” revealed itself as a source of constant personal
and professional frustration. It is therefore not surprising that lawyers
do feel a sense of professional achievement if and when they are able
to divert from the plea bargain track and actually do the work of a “real
lawyer.” This complexity about plea bargains also explains the critique
voiced by some of the lawyers towards others, regarding the abuse of
the plea system, explained above.
D. Impact of the Palestinian Authority
My research revealed that defense lawyers in the military courts
are influenced by the PA in a number of ways. First, as mentioned
above, the PA Ministry of Prisoners Affairs and the prisoners’ NGOs
pay the lawyers to represent defendants and detainees in the military
courts. 102 Most lawyers are hired on a retainer basis, through yearly
renewable contracts. They are therefore obliged to take representation
and, accordingly, many have very heavy caseloads.
A number of lawyers mentioned that they used to work with the
PA and the NGOs but have ceased to do so for a number of reasons.
101. For example, according to the Israeli State Attorney Report for 2017, almost forty
percent of investigation cases referred to the State Attorney’s Office ended with no indictment,
following screening by the police or another investigatory agency. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE,
STATE ATTORNEY REPORT FOR 2017 (2017) (Isr.), http://www.justice.gov.il/
Units/StateAttorney/Documents/data-report-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FNV-6CMN]. In
contrast, human rights organizations report a very high percentage of detentions leading to
indictments of Palestinian detainees and a policy to release detainees. See PRESUMED GUILTY,
supra note 26. I have not found equivalent data on number of investigations conducted compared
to number of indictments in the Occupied Territories.
102. See supra Part IV.
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The first is the lack of discretion about the number and type of cases
they can handle, resulting in a loss of professional independence. The
second is their notion that criminal defense has in and of itself become
an “industry,” a source of a steady and stable income that turns the
NGOs, as well as the lawyers, into stakeholders in the continuance of
the occupation. Another lawyer complained about the lack of
supervision by the NGOs and the PA over lawyers’ competence and
the quality of representation, hence their unwillingness to be affiliated
with criminal defense.
The relationship between the defense lawyers and the PA/NGOs
is, however, more complex than merely providing the means to
represent defendants and detainees. The PA cooperates with the
Palestinian Committee of Prisoners’ Affairs, established by the PLO
(“Palestinian Liberation Organization”). 103 This committee is the body
that provides financial support to the Palestinian prisoners’ families.104
Although moneys are channeled through the PA, the committee
remains an important political actor in the prisoners’ affairs. This
financial support includes the fees for lawyers’ representation of
defendants and detainees in the military courts. The affiliation between
the PA and the committee is complex and affected by the relationship
between the PA and the Israeli government. Israel had demanded that
the PA dissolve the prisoners’ committee, objecting to payments made
by the PA to Palestinian prisoners and their families. 105 As part of this
position, in 2018 the Israeli government-initiated legislation to
authorize it to cease transfer of funds to the PA because of its support
of prisoners. 106 The legislation is pending. 107
103. See supra Part IV and accompanying notes.
104. See supra Part IV and accompanying notes.
105. See, e.g., Dov Lieber, Defying US, Palestinian official vows payments to terrorists
will continue, The Times of Israel (June 14, 2017), https://www.timesofisrael.com/defying-uspalestinian-official-vows-payments-to-prisoners-will-continue/
[https://perma.cc/GP36YCPW]; Al-Resalah: Abbas plans to dissolve Palestinian Committee of Prisoners’ Affairs,
MA’AN NEWS AGENCY (June 19, 2017), https://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?id=777713
[https://perma.cc/VZA8-YC8U].
106. In general, the Israeli government considers the PA’s support for Palestinians
convicted of security offenses – including providing financial support to their families, as well
as other forms of support such as legal defence - as unacceptable. The government has initiated
legislative steps to authorize the government to deduct from the moneys Israel transfers to the
PA (mainly taxes collected in relation to Palestinian workers) the sum the PA provides families
of convicted offenders. See e.g., Shahar Hay, Knesset passes bill to deduct terror funds from PA
in first reading, YNEY (May 8, 2018), https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L5254508,00.html [https://perma.cc/YYP3-RU95].
107. Id.
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Meanwhile, from time to time, the prisoners’ committee exercises
great influence in relation to Israeli prison conditions and affairs,
including through declaring prison strikes on various grounds. For
example, in April 2017, the committee declared a hunger strike of all
Palestinian prisoners, mainly related to policies of family visitation to
prisons. 108 As part of the strike, defense lawyers were instructed to
suspend their representation and not to appear in the military courts.109
The lawyers interviewed reported that all lawyers obeyed this
instruction. The expectation to comply with this collective decision
was, apparently, unambiguous, and there was no room for individual
non-compliance. The court strike lasted for a few days, during which
court hearings were disrupted and entered a state of disarray, to the
point that the court administration considered appointing Israeli
lawyers to replace the lawyers on strike. 110 However, the strike ended
shortly thereafter and representation resumed.
E.

Defense Lawyers and Families

The interviews I conducted, along with my observations, showed
that most lawyers underscored the significance of their relationships
with their clients’ families and explained that serving as a liaison
between client and family is an integral part of their professional
mission. Most often, the first approach to a lawyer is carried out by a
family member, and the lawyer remains the family’s prominent linkage
to their detained family member during the period of detention and
imprisonment.
Most lawyers seemed to take for granted their function as support
providers for the families. One lawyer explicitly described herself as a
“social worker” in addition to being a lawyer, and in general, this
responsibility seems to blend into the “job description” of the defense
lawyer. 111 During the court hearing, the role of the lawyer is amplified.
Families may attend the hearing (up to two members), and the court is
108. See, e.g., Hundreds of Palestinian prisoners in Israel go on hunger strike, THE
GUARDIAN (Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/17/palestinianprisoners-israel-hunger-strike [https://perma.cc/QY9J-WT8J]; Mass Palestinian hunger strike
in Israeli jails ends after visitation deal, THE GUARDIAN (May 27, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/27/mass-palestinian-hunger-strike-israel-ends
[https://perma.cc/CU9N-UASU].
109. Interviews (July 2017).
110. Id.
111. Id.
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the place where they see the detainee and can perceive their wellbeing.
Since the family is not permitted to formally engage with the detainee
(through touching or passing belongings), the lawyer bridges this
distance. There are situations in which decisions about the amount of
punitive fines are reached by the family member, with or without the
client being involved. For example, the customary rate of exchange
between a fine and jail time is ILS1,000 (the equivalent to about
US$300) for one month of jail time. There were cases in which this
negotiation was conducted between the lawyer and the family member
first, and afterwards the client’s consent was obtained.
F.

Motivations for Military Court Practice

In my interviews, I found that lawyers expressed a mixture of
motivations for practicing in the military courts. Some stated that it was
work with a good and steady income, insinuating that representation
became simply another routine job. Most lawyers, however,
emphasized in some way or another the political dimensions of their
work.
Most lawyers underscored the individualistic aspect of their work
as embodying political dimensions—assisting a person involved in the
struggle against the occupation; one lawyer described his work as “my
way to assist in the resistance to the occupation”; another explained
that the practice keeps him within the inner circles of knowledge about
the politics of resistance to occupation. Another lawyer claimed his
main motivation was to provide quality representation to the families
of detainees, to counter poor and unethical representation of other
lawyers. One lawyer talked about his motivation to “do justice” for his
clients, something he believed could be done in the military courts. A
number of lawyers explained that representation is what lawyers do as
“witness bearers” to the injustice done by the occupation. In this sense,
lawyers’ participation in the judicial process is considered part of a
historical, collective act documenting a counter-narrative to that
forwarded by the State of Israel of an enlightened occupation. At the
same time, one lawyer explained that he has been working in the field
for so many years, that it was hard to leave, though he would have liked
to.
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G. The Dilemma of Legitimation
A most noteworthy finding in my research was that the question
of legitimating the occupation—i.e., whether, through their
participation in the judicial process, they take part in strengthening its
legitimacy—was familiar to almost all lawyers. Most of them
responded that they understood the dilemma and acknowledged it, but
refused to take responsibility for it. Their main argument was that in
general, representation is not a professional decision - neither a
collective nor an individual one. They rejected any attempt to impose
the burden of legitimation upon the lawyers. Only one lawyer said that
she thinks about the dilemma every time she appears in court, but still,
she stated that it is not a strong enough reason for her to abandon the
practice.
The reason articulated by the lawyers was that representation in
the military courts was a practice accepted by the political collective to
which they belonged, represented by the PA and the Office for
Prisoners’ Affairs. After all, the salary of many lawyers originates from
the PA’s budget. Hence, if the PA (representing the Palestinians) does
not want legal representation in the military courts to take place, it
could order so. As long as it does not, representation is not a personalprofessional decision, but a national-collective one.
H. Back to the Question of Professionalism
Asked at the end of my questionnaire if they feel that they can be
“a good lawyer” in the military courts, most lawyers answered in the
affirmative, with reference to the individual aspects of their practice.
They identified and emphasized personal agency as grounds for this
answer. If the lawyer makes the effort to read the police files, if she
analyzes the evidence against her client, keeps up with legal precedent,
takes advantage of mishaps that occurred during interrogation, and
articulates a sound legal argument when possible, then one can be a
good lawyer.
One lawyer estimated that it is probably better to represent a client
accused of a security offense in the military court compared to the civil
court in Israel. Here, he explained, everyone is accused of a security
offense; it is the rule not the exception, and conduct is measured by a
relative scale of severity, which is different than in an Israeli court. The
political conflict that bore the judicial process is “the normal,” the
everyday reality within which military judges, prosecutors, and defense
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lawyers conduct their affairs. The insular nature of the court is an
advantage, which persistent and professional lawyers can use to benefit
their clients.
Hence, the defense lawyers managed to construct a space,
although temporary and highly restrictive, that provided them with a
sense of professional competence and identity.
IX. CONCLUSION
The literature on the legitimizing effect of law on political and
social change is well established. A significant portion of it points to
the depoliticizing effects of law on political struggles. 112 At the center
of this critique stands the practice of impact litigation, or legal reform
litigation, in which lawyers proactively approach the courts, seek
redress for rights violations, and ask courts to create change by
establishing legal precedents that become general obligatory norms. 113
In the context of the Israeli occupation, such proactive legal
strategy has been used extensively. The strategy has been used through
direct petitions to the Israeli Supreme Court against acts of the military
government, and to some extent through civil damages suits litigated
before the Israeli civil courts on behalf of civilians injured or killed by
Israeli security forces. 114
The legal course adopted by Israeli and Palestinian civil society
organizations, to petition the Israeli Supreme Court for legal remedies,
has been contentious. 115 The controversy over impact litigation of this
sort had intensified as the occupation has continued, given the overall
assessment that, in the long run, its costs will have become greater than
its benefits. 116 To be sure, occasionally the Supreme Court has provided
112. See, e.g., STUART A. SHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS, LAWYERS, PUBLIC
POLITICS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1974).
113. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (Univ. of Chi. Press, 2d ed., 2008).
114. DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF ISREAL
AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (2002); Gilat J. Bachar, Access Denied – Using Procedure to
Restrict Tort Litigation: Lessons from the Israeli-Palestinian Experience, 92 Cʜɪ.-Kᴇɴᴛ L. Rᴇᴠ.
841 (2018).
115. Kretzmer, supra note 11; Ronen Shamir, Landmark Cases and the Reproduction of
Legitimacy: The Case of Israel’s High Court of Justice, 24 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 781, 781 (1990).
116. Kretzmer, supra note 11; Ben Naftali, supra note 56; George E. Bisharat, Law, Land
and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occupied Territories, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 467, 562 (1994);
Behnam Dayanim, The Israeli Supreme Court and the Deportations of Palestinians: The
Interaction of Law and Legitimacy, 30 STAN. J. INT’L. L. 143 (1994).
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an ad hoc remedy or restricted the military government, but with most
“hard cases,” such as house demolitions, targeted killings, the legality
of the settlements, and deportations—it has sided with the government,
providing it with an aura of legality and legitimacy. As David Kretzmer
explains, “[i]t would be naïve to think that a domestic court could deal
with such an anomalous situation as if it were an outside, neutral,
observer that is oblivious to the political realities in its own country.” 117
At first blush, the topic of this Article escapes this critique. The
lawyers subject of this Article are not initiating litigation in military
courts or calling for court intervention. They do not harness the law to
bring about change, but use law in its most traditional role—as a shield
to protect individuals from state power. Their appearance before the
courts is defensive rather than proactive, and hardly involves
reformative legal argumentation.
Nevertheless, there are significant depoliticizing aspects to
defense lawyering as well. As Ronen Shamir and Sarah Chinsky note,
for the criminal defense lawyer to achieve the best result on behalf of
her client, she must remove and disassociate the client as much as
possible from the political context in which the offense was allegedly
committed. 118 The accused must minimize his involvement with the act
against the occupier, rather than stand behind what is often considered
an act of resistance.
From an institutional perspective, the military government has a
strong interest to portray the military courts as a judicial system that
resembles a civil justice system, completely detached from the nondemocratic base of its apparatus. This contributes to normalizing the
occupation, with a legitimizing and a pacifying effect. What is
considered by the occupied as resistance, is transformed into a criminal
offense, and at times an act of terror. Channeling such acts into the
military courts, which gradually assume the features of a fair judicial
process—including strong reliance on defense lawyers—depoliticizes
the reality in which the military courts operate.

117. Kretzmer, supra note 11, at 236.
118. Ronen Shamir & Sara Chinsky, Destruction of Houses and Construction of a Cause:
Lawyers and Bedouins in Israeli Courts, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS
AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 227 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998); Neta
Ziv, Lawyers Talking Rights and Clients Breaking Rules: Between Legal Positivism and
Distributive Justice in Israeli Poverty Lawyering, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 209 (2004).

760

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:2

Palestinian defense lawyers have been operating in the military
courts amidst this contradiction for many decades, and from the
interviews conducted seem well aware of the dynamics described
above. However, over time, these arguments have lost much of their
force. They have largely been relegated to the books of critical scholars,
hovering above the day-to-day work of the Palestinian defense lawyers
in the military courts of the occupation.
After fifty years of occupation, the lawyers have no illusions: law
has neither the power to obstruct the occupation, nor to significantly
contribute to its continuance. It offers very little opportunity for
resistance, but it is hardly a force of legitimation.
It seems the lawyers have developed justifications for their
practice within boundaries of a reasoning that is largely constructed by
the enclosed military court system. The involvement of the PA in
funding lawyers’ defense takes part in institutionalizing their practice.
Their special responsibility vis-à-vis their clients’ families bestows
upon them a unique role that no one else can fulfill.
The formalization and improvement of the courts’ procedures
offer opportunities for some lawyers to exhibit professionalism and
enhanced lawyering skills. Even the internal stratification—the
differentiation between lawyers who serve their clients professionally
and those who do less so—contributes to this process. It assists in
creating a self-imagined experience of professionalism that thrives
within the confines of a perplexing judicial regime.
On the one hand, the military court embraces the lawyers. It fully
integrates them within its process; it greatly depends on them to
maintain the judicial scheme, and the lawyers seem aware of this
entanglement. The court engages the lawyers in a professional
interaction, constructing an experience of familiarity and mutual
understanding about the rules of the legal game, as well as its
boundaries. At the same time, the Palestinian defense lawyers will
always remain outsiders in this system. They will never truly belong to
the community that established the military courts, with which they
continuously engage. At the end of the court day, the lawyers—
Palestinians and Israelis alike—return to a place, where the external
political reality overshadows any real or imagined sense of justice they
may have envisioned in the military court.

